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 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has been substituted for former Attorney General*
John Ashcroft, the original respondent in this case, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c).
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 04-1756
__________
VYTAS VERBEJUS,
                    Petitioner
vs.
ALBERTO R. GONZALES,*
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
__________
On Petition for Review of an Order of Removal
from the Board of Immigration Appeals
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
(BIA No. A79-762-271)
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 27, 2005
___________
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ALITO and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 15, 2005)
      __________
OPINION
__________
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Garth, Circuit Judge:
Writing, as we do, only for the benefit of the parties, we recite only those facts
essential to decide this appeal.  Vytas Verbejus, a native and citizen of Lithuania,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his motion
to reconsider his deportation case.  In so doing, Verbejus also challenges several aspects,
both procedural and substantive, of the underlying deportation order, centering on the
behavior of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) during his deportation proceeding.  We are thus
called upon to review the final order of deportation, as well as the order denying the
motion to reconsider.  These orders are independently reviewable final orders.
  According to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), a petition for review of a final order of removal
“must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”  This
time period is “jurisdictional in nature and must be construed with strict fidelity to [its]
terms.”  Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995).  Moreover, the filing of a subsequent
motion to reconsider a final order of deportation does not toll the 30-day period for
seeking review of the underlying order and does not render the underlying order
non-final.  Id.; see also Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (3d Cir. 1986) (neither
filing a motion to reopen nor motion to reconsider suspends the time for filing a petition
for review of the underlying order).  Here, the BIA issued the final order of removal on
October 7, 2003, but Verbejus did not petition for review of this decision until March 19,
2004.  He thus failed to file a timely petition for review of the BIA’s order affirming the
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IJ’s decision.  Rather, he petitioned for review of the BIA’s March 1, 2004 decision
denying his motion to reconsider.  As noted, the filing of a motion to reconsider does not
toll the 30-day limitations period.  See id.  We thus lack jurisdiction to reach Verbejus’s
challenges to the underlying deportation order denying his applications for relief from
removal.  
We nevertheless feel compelled to make known our disapproval of the IJ’s conduct
here, conduct which was adversarial, humiliating and hostile.  While we appreciate the
difficulties faced by immigration judges in asylum cases, and while we are satisfied that
the petitioner’s rights were not violated in this case, we remain mindful that there is a
proper, principled, and professional way to conduct immigration proceedings.  Although
immigration judges have, as one of their primary functions, the determination of
credibility, immigration judges would be well-advised, in future cases, to avoid even the
appearance of prejudgment of the credibility of witnesses and the validity of a petitioner’s
claims.
  We are left to determine only whether the BIA erred by denying the motion to
reconsider.  Denials of motions for reconsideration are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Nocon, 789 F.2d at 1033 (reviewing the BIA’s denial of a
motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion.).  A motion to reconsider, governed by 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), requires an applicant to “specify[] the errors of fact or law in the
prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”  The BIA here found
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that Verbejus, in his motion to reconsider, merely reiterated the same arguments to the
denial of his applications for relief from removal, thereby failing to state any specific
legal or factual errors in the BIA’s October 7, 2003 decision.  Likewise, Verbejus
advances no argument before us which would warrant overturning the BIA’s denial of his
motion.  Accordingly, we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to reconsider. 
We will DENY the Petition for Review of the BIA’s decision.
